By Chris Zambelis
In the new Middle East, formerly suppressed political parties, movements, and ideas are increasingly shaping a political and ideological discourse that departs from previous paradigms. An equally important trend that is receiving less attention, however, is the mobilization of counter-revolutionary and reactionary forces opposed to the changes taking place in the region. In this regard, Saudi Arabia's proposal to forge a formal union with Bahrain, a subject that topped the agenda in a summit of the leaders of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member states in Riyadh last month, warrants a closer look.
The collective call for freedom and democracy that has toppled despots in Tunisia and Egypt and threatened the survivability of other autocracies, including key Saudi allies, has not sat well with Riyadh. The onset of public demonstrations in Bahrain in February 2011 elicited Saudi Arabia's most forceful response to date. At
the official request of the Bahraini royal family, a Saudi-led contingent of the GCC's Peninsula Shield Force (PSF) entered Bahrain on March 14, 2011 to crush democratic opposition protests under the auspices of the GCC's Peninsula Shield defense pact.
The protests in Bahrain raised particular alarm in the Saudi Arabai for three reasons:
1. The expressions of dissent in a fellow Arab monarchy and GCC member demonstrated that the GCC was not immune to the brand of democratic activism being exhibited elsewhere in the Arab world.
2. Bahrain is led by a Sunni monarchy that presides over a largely impoverished and underserved Shi'ite majority that makes up at least 70% of the country's total population. While the grievances and demands of the Bahraini opposition were articulated by a wide segment of society, Bahrain's demographics raised the specter of similar events occurring within Saudi Arabia. Bahraini Shi'ite face widespread discrimination in what is largely viewed as a minority Sunni dominated society. Bahrain's geographic proximity to Saudi Arabia's Shi'ite minority in the kingdom's Eastern Province, where most of the country's oil wealth is concentrated, amplifies the perceived threat emanating from the uprising in Bahrain.
As a result, Saudi Arabia worries that its own restive Shi'ite minority will take a cue from their kin in Bahrain and rise up. Like their counterparts in Bahrain, the Saudi Shi'ite also endure persecution by the ultraconservative Sunni regime that regards them as heretics. In the face of violent crackdowns by Saudi Arabia's security forces, the Shi'ite organized demonstrations in Saudi areas such as al-Hasa, al-Qatif, and Safwa to protest the Bahraini crackdown against opposition forces. Saudi Arabia's Shi'ite also voiced anger over their predicament in Saudi society and demanded that Riyadh withdraw its military from Bahrain.
3. Saudi Arabia believes that the unrest in Bahrain and elsewhere in the region strengthens the hand of its rival, Iran. The sectarian narrative underlying the protests in Bahrain that describes a largely Shi'ite majority demanding greater freedom and human rights of the ruling Sunni monarchy reinforces Saudi Arabia's position relative to Iran. For Saudi Arabia, the Shi'ite in Bahrain and other Persian Gulf countries represent an Iranian-directed fifth column ready to act at Tehran's behest. Saudi Arabia often relies on inflammatory sectarian rhetoric to paint Iran and Arab Shi'ite in the region as hostile forces. Just days before Saudi-led GCC forces entered Bahrain, for instance, the Saudi daily al-Jazirah published a series of articles entitled "Safavid Iran's plans for the destruction of the Gulf States".
As the unofficial leader of the GCC, a body that includes fellow monarchies Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia is a longtime proponent of expanding the group's mandate into a formal union. The GCC was founded in 1981 during the Iraq-Iraq War (1980-1988) and in the aftermath of the Iranian Revolution of 1979. The establishment of the GCC represented an attempt by the six Persian Gulf Arab monarchies to encourage closer political, economic, and security relations amid regional instability and the perceived threat posed by Iran.
Beyond their monarchical character, GCC members share other attributes in common. GCC members host a number of US military installations, including the regional headquarters of the US Central Command in Qatar and the US Navy's Fifth Fleet in Bahrain. Each GCC member also maintains close ties with the United States. Save for Bahrain, the GCC members are also rich in oil and natural gas. GCC capital in the form of sovereign wealth funds has propelled its members into the upper echelons of global financial power.
At the same time, the GCC is beset with internal rivalries on a range of issues. While GCC members agree in principle on the utility of a confederation, there appears to be little serious interest within the body to unite at this stage outside of the embattled leadership in Manama. Saudi Arabia nevertheless feels compelled to proceed with creating a union with Bahrain. Saudi Arabia has also led the way to extend the prospect of GCC membership to two Arab monarchies located outside of the Persian Gulf area, namely, Morocco and Jordan. To various degrees Morocco and Jordan, authoritarian states in their own rights, have also experienced protests demanding greater freedom and reform.
Precise details surrounding Riyadh's plan to unite Bahrain with Saudi Arabia are unclear. While national sovereignty and decision-making powers will be protected in a federal system, the proposed union between a vastly larger and stronger Saudi Arabia and a relatively tiny and weak Bahrain is difficult to envisage in practice.
Overall, Saudi Arabia's intentions towards establishing a union with Bahrain are shaped by its rivalry with Iran. Similarly, Bahrain's relative weakness is also pushing it into Saudi Arabia's fold. The strategic undercurrents of Saudi Arabia's drive to unite with Bahrain have not been lost on Iran, which has criticized the move in harsh terms. Iranians have also staged protests against the proposed confederation.
In a reference to Iran's historical territorial claims over Bahrain, an Iranian parliamentarian lashed out against Saudi Arabia's plans: "If it [Bahrain] is supposed to be annexed, it will go to the Islamic Republic not [the] al-Saud [family]".
In a more official response, Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Ramin Mehmanparast suggested, "The crackdown on people, military and security intervention by neighboring countries like Saudi Arabia, and plans like the proposal for the formation of a union between Bahrain and Saudi Arabia are, in our view, ill-advised measures, which will deepen the crisis". Given the stakes involved, Bahrain will remain a crucial strategic battleground between Saudi Arabia and Iran in the months ahead.
Chris Zambelis is an author and researcher with Helios Global, Inc, a risk management group based in the Washington, DC area. The opinions expressed here are the author's alone and do not necessarily reflect the position of Helios Global, Inc.
(This article first appeared in The Jamestown Foundation. Used with permission.)
(Copyright 2012 The Jamestown Foundation.)
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